Middle Eastern Perspectives 2: Regional Cooperation and Development

Israeli author Kobe Huberman wrote an article simultaneously published with my previous article under the same title. Huberman’s article was published on our Middle Eastern initiative’s website, MENA2050. Both articles discuss two key aspects: the transformation of the Middle East’s political landscape from 2002 to 2022 and the need to reshape perspectives into a three-dimensional framework to address challenges bravely. This includes reframing the peace process in the Middle East from a perspective of regional cooperation and solidarity, for the benefit of all people in the region.
While acknowledging the security challenges faced by the region, it is essential not to overemphasize them at the expense of supporting developmental initiatives that contribute to stability. Several examples demonstrate this point, such as the electricity-for-water initiatives involving the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Israel. The establishment of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund’s direct investment initiative in Iraq with its various sectors, as well as the regional multi-party cooperation in electricity transmission to Lebanon and the connection of Iraq to the Gulf electrical grid, highlight the potential for regional collaboration and its positive impact on development.
Middle Eastern Perspectives

Attendance at the Herzliya Conference, or “Herzlia” as some pronounce it, is seen as a new station in exploring and understanding the spectra of Israeli politics and Israelis, as well as others who attended or participated in its sessions. Investigation was the key to all discussions to understand the details of recent approaches towards the (Chinese/American) region and the potential transformations it may produce in the regional balances. Despite the diversity of Israeli perspectives, their security concern remains the primary driving and governing force for their regional outlook, followed by the development of what the Abraham Accords have established. The third is achieving “normalization” with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is manifested in their urging of the American ally to leverage all its political weight with Riyadh to achieve that. Despite the absence of accounting for the costs or consequences of such an approach from the Israeli side, or understanding and comprehending Riyadh’s priorities from its Saudi and Islamic perspective, the second driving force is the unstable political situation in Israel, which “repels” any possibility of such rapprochement.